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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN QUAS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 890601-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
In the February 6, 1992 Quas opinion, this Court relied on 
State v. Humphrey, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 1991), in holding that 
Mr. Quas' conviction mooted, cured and/or rendered harmless any 
defects in the bindover order. Quas at 2, 3, and 5. 
This Court has not had the benefit of briefing by the 
parties on the Humphrey decision. Because this Court has not had 
the opportunity to fully consider the constitutional ramifications 
of the Humphrey decision in the context of this case, Mr. Quas 
respectfully requests rehearing.1 See Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512 
(Utah 1886)(explaining circumstances allowing rehearing); Cumminas 
v. Nielson. 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913)(same). 
1. In the original proceedings for rehearing of the June 
18, 1991 Quas decision, counsel for Mr. Quas and counsel for the 
State agreed that the opinion's plain error analysis relating to 
expert testimony was confusing and should be modified, although the 
parties disagreed as to how the analysis should be modified. 
Petition at 7-8; response at 5-6. The February 6, 1992 Quas 
decision contains the same plain error analysis. Counsel for Mr. 
Quas maintain but do not repeat the argument raised in the original 
petition for rehearing concerning the plain error analysis, and 
refer to that argument here in order to preserve it. 
A copy of this Court's February 6, 1992 opinion is in 
Appendix 1. A copy of the Humphrey decision is in Appendix 2. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
BECAUSE THE DEFECTIVE BINDOVER ORDER 
CONSTITUTES A DEFECT IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT, 
IT CANNOT BE CURED, MOOTED OR RENDERED HARMLESS 
BY THE CONVICTION. 
The Ouas opinion's holding that any error in the bindover 
order was mooted, cured or rendered harmless by Mr. Quas' conviction 
is based on footnote 6 of State v. Humphrey. 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
(Utah 1991), which states, 
We note that if the orders of magistrates 
were in fact orders of a circuit court, the Utah 
State Constitution would provide an appeal as of 
right from these orders. Utah Const, art. I, 
§12, art. VIII §5. Interlocutory appeal to the 
court of appeals would not satisfy this 
requirement. We believe this right likewise 
would not be satisfied if the defendant first had 
to endure trial in the district court, because 
any challenges to the bindover order would be 
mooted by the trial verdict.2 Our construction 
avoids this constitutional problem. 
Id. at 10-11. 
This portion of the Humphrey opinion is dicta. 
2. This portion of the Humphrey opinion may be attributed 
to the briefs of the appellant/petitioners in Humphrey. which raised 
the mootness argument and failed to appreciate the jurisdictional 
nature of proper preliminary hearings. See briefs of appellants in 
case numbers 890424-CA, 890130-CA, 890666-CA; and of petitioners in 
case number 900434. Appellate counsel regrets the confusion arising 
from her argument. 
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The holding of Humphrey is key to understanding why the 
illegal bindover order was not mooted or rendered harmless by Mr. 
Quas# conviction. Repeatedly throughout the Humphrey opinion, the 
court held that a proper bindover order is essential to the 
jurisdiction of the district court over the criminal case, and that 
the district court has the obligation to review the bindover 
proceedings, to insure that the district court's original 
jurisdiction is invoked properly. Humphrey at 9 and 10 and nn. 2 
and 5.3 
Because a defective bindover order fails to properly invoke 
the jurisdiction of the district court, it cannot be considered 
harmless error under the state or federal constitutions. State v. 
Pay, 146 P.2d 300 (Utah 1950), was decided under the Utah 
Constitution. There, the court characterized deficiencies in the 
3. Utah's conditioning of district court jurisdiction on a 
proper bindover order differs from decisions from other courts. See 
footnote 4 of State's supplemental brief at page 13 (arguing that 
this Court should follow case law from California holding that 
insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing does not constitute 
a jurisdictional defect in the trial court). Humphrey and State v. 
Freeman. 71 P.2d 196 (Utah 1937), cited in footnote 2 of Humphrey 
for the proposition that district court jurisdiction is contingent 
upon the propriety of the bindover order, are decided under Utah 
statutes and the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the Utah Supreme 
Court's holdings conditioning district court jurisdiction on the 
propriety of the bindover order are binding on all state and federal 
courts. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 561 
(1983)(jurisdictional provisions based in state constitutions are 
matters of state law, and the rulings of the state court control); 
State v. Pay, 146 P. 300 (Utah 1915)(in discussing how a district 
court's jurisdiction is contingent on the propriety of the bindover 
proceedings, the Utah court discussed law from other jurisdictions, 
but found the Utah Constitution controlling). 
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preliminary hearing as flaws in the trial court's jurisdiction. Id. 
at 302 and 305. Because of errors occurring in the preliminary 
hearing proceedings, the court reversed Mr. Pay's conviction beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and ordered the trial court to quash the 
information so that Mr. Pay's rights to proper preliminary 
proceedings would be protected. Id. at 306. The court did not 
apply harmless error analysis to the jurisdictional defect arising 
from deficiencies in the preliminary hearing. 
In Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), the Court 
held that federal magistrates do not have jurisdiction to conduct 
voir dire in felony trials without the defendant's consent. The 
Court further held that jurisdictional defects can never be harmless 
error, stating, 
Among those basic fair trial rights that "'can 
never be treated as harmless'11 is a defendant's 
"right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge 
or jury." Equally basic is a defendant's right 
to have all critical stages of a criminal trial 
conducted by a person with jurisdiction to 
preside. Thus harmless-error analysis does not 
apply in a felony case in which, despite the 
defendant's objection and without any meaningful 
review by a district judger an officer exceeds 
his jurisdiction by selecting a jury. 
Id. at 876 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Gomez is a 
unanimous decision. 
The Quas opinion relies on several cases to support the 
holding that the conviction mooted, or cured, defects in the 
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preliminary hearing in this case.4 The federal cases relied on do 
not support the holding, but are inapposite to this case because 
those cases do not involve jurisdictional flaws resulting from 
inadequacies in preliminary hearings, and because those cases were 
not decided under Utah law establishing the jurisdictional 
significance of preliminary hearings in this state. 
Rather than supporting the holding that errors in 
preliminary hearings are cured or mooted by convictions beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Schreuder demonstrates the opposite. Quas 
correctly notes that Schreuder holds that an illegal arrest does not 
justify a reversal of a valid conviction. However, Schreuder 
reaches that conclusion only after determining that an illegal 
arrest is not a jurisdictional defect. 712 P.2d 264, at 272. 
4. The opinion states, 
This holding is supported by case law from 
the United States Supreme Court and from this 
state establishing that an error at the 
preliminary stage is cured if the defendant is 
later convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. 
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 
5. Ct. 938, 942 (1986) (presence of two witnesses 
in grand jury room, although illegal, is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt in light of subsequent 
conviction); Holt v. United States. 218 U.S. 245, 
31 S. Ct. 2, 4 (1910)(conviction upheld where 
errors such as hearsay and incompetent evidence 
occurred at indictment stage); see also State v. 
Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985)(the fact 
defendant was convicted cured any defect in 
temporary period of possibly wrongful 
detention)(citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
119, 95 S. Ct. 854, 866 (1975). 
Quas at 3. 
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In contrast to the non-jurisdictional illegal arrest issue, in 
disposing of the preliminary hearing issues, despite Mr. Schreuder/s 
valid conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, the court did not apply 
harmless error analysis or declare that the conviction mooted 
defects in Mr. Schreuder's preliminary hearing. The court addressed 
each issue relating to the preliminary hearing fully on the merits, 
finding that Mr. Schreuder's preliminary hearing was conducted 
properly. 712 P.2d at 267-270. 
Particularly because the jury conviction of Mr. Quas is 
nullified by the failure of the bindover order to invoke the trial 
court's jurisdiction, the jury conviction does not cure the improper 
bindover order. More importantly, because the jury may never have 
been selected in the absence of the improper bindover, the jury's 
conviction cannot be used to render the bindover error harmless. 
See Vasquez v. Hillery. 474 U.S. 254, 263, (1986)(Court could not 
rely on defendant's conviction to apply harmless error analysis to 
racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury, because 
Court could not determine whether the defendant would have been 
indicted at all in the absence of the error occurring in the grand 
jury proceedings). 
II. 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING ISSUE 
MUST BE RESOLVED ON THE MERITS. 
As the Quas opinion accurately relays, Mr. Quas has never 
had the opportunity for a resolution of his claim that this case 
should have been dismissed before trial because the prosecution's 
-6 -
refiling of the information in the successive preliminary hearing 
did not meet the Utah Constitution's due process standards set forth 
in State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Under Utah law, Mr. 
Quas has always had the right to challenge the improper bindover 
order, but the district court which had jurisdiction to quash the 
bindover order improperly ruled that it had no jurisdiction to 
review the bindover order, and the Utah Supreme Court declined Mr. 
Quas' petition for interlocutory review of that ruling. Quas at 2. 
The Quas opinion's abstention from the merits, and holding 
that any errors in the bindover order are mooted, cured, or rendered 
harmless by the conviction entered in the trial court raise 
troubling concerns about due process, equal protection and uniform 
operation of laws. As is explained below, several constitutional 
guarantees require that Mr. Quas' challenge to the preliminary 
hearings in his case be heard on the merits. 
Due process of law, provided by Article I section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution, requires the following essentials before a 
person's liberty may be taken by the state: 
(a) the existence of a competent person, body, or 
agency authorized by law to determine the 
questions; (b) an inquiry into the merits of the 
question by such person, body or agency; (c) 
notice to the person of the inauguration and 
purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such 
person should appear if he wishes to be heard; 
(d) the right to appear in person or by counsel; 
(e) fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine 
and cross-examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be 
rendered upon the record thus made. 
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Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). The due 
process violation stemming from the district court's lack of proper 
jurisdiction (resulting from the improper bindover order), is 
compounded by the fact that Mr. Quas has never had an opportunity to 
be heard on the merits concerning the district court's lack of 
jurisdiction. Id. 
Likewise, under federal due process standards, Mr. Quas is 
entitled to have the bindover issue resolved on the merits. The 
right to a proper preliminary hearing in Utah has been characterized 
by the Utah Supreme Court as "fundamental" and "sacred." State v. 
Nelson, 176 P.860, 862 (Utah 1918). Depriving Mr. Quas of this 
right because the trial court erroneously concluded that it did not 
have the jurisdiction to enforce the right would be so fundamentally 
unfair as to constitute both a substantive and procedural due 
process violation under federal standards.5 As the Court explained 
in Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930), "[W]hile it 
is for the state courts to determine the adjective as well as the 
substantive law of the State, they must, in so doing, accord the 
parties due process of law. Whether acting through its judiciary or 
5. Under federal law, "'substantive due process' prevents 
the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks the 
conscience,7 or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.' When government action depriving a person of 
life, liberty or property survives substantive due process scrutiny, 
it must still be implemented in a fair manner. This requirement has 
traditionally been referred to as 'procedural7 due process." United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)(citations omitted). 
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through its legislature, a State may not deprive a person of all 
existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the State 
has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him 
some real opportunity to protect it." Id. at 681-682 (footnote 
omitted). 
Principles of uniform operation and equal protection of the 
laws also require that Mr. Quas be heard on the merits concerning 
the improper bindover order. Under Quas, through no fault of his 
own, Mr. Quas has been denied the right, provided by the law to all 
Utah felony defendants,6 to have his preliminary hearings reviewed 
on the merits. But for the erroneous ruling of the district court, 
Mr. Quas would have had the remedy provided by the Utah Constitution 
under Brickey. dismissal of his case prior to trial. The trial 
court's error is not an acceptable reason to penalize Mr. Quas with 
the sacrifice of his right to review of the preliminary hearing 
under Article I section 24. See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 
670-671 (Utah 1984)(interpreting Article I section 24, the court 
explained, "When persons are similarly situated, it is 
unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons from 
among a larger class on the basis of a tenuous justification that 
has little or no merit."). 
Federal standards similarly require Utah courts to grant 
6. See e.g. State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 270 (Utah 
1985)(no equal protection problem arose because defendant did have 
the opportunity, given to all felony defendants, for review of the 
preliminary hearing). 
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Mr. Quas equal protection of the laws granting the right to review 
of the bindover order. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)("The 
command of the Fourteenth Amendment is that no 'State' shall deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 'A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its 
judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The 
constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the 
State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, 
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."1). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Quas requests rehearing of his case. 
Respectfully submitted this day o f 'IrljjUl ., 1992 . 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Mr. Quas 
CANDICE A. JOHNSON 
ELIZABETH HOXBROOK 
Attorney for ifcri. Quas 
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Appendix 1 
Quas decision 
FILED 
This opinion is subject to revision before FEB 6 1992 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Oj^ypva*-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ' 4ta*T.Noonan 
ClSk of the Court 
00O00 jjjah coyrt of Appeals 
Sta te of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
John Quas, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890601-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 6, 1992) 
Attorneys: Lisa J. Remal, Candice A. Johnson, and Elizabeth 
Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S.H. Atherton, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Onne. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant, John Quas, appeals his conviction of second 
degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1991). We affirm. 
We recite the Tfacts from the record in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 
1135, 1137 (Utah 1989). On the evening of June 15, 1987, 
appellant John Quas and his wife Susan Quas were at home. Both 
had been drinking. The two began to argue and to discuss 
divorce. Sometime that evening, appellant allegedly shot and 
killed Mrs. Quas. At 9:41 p.m. appellant called the Salt Lake 
County 911 operator to report that his wife had shot herself. A 
police officer and paramedics arrived within four minutes of 
appellant's call. Mrs. Quas was found dead, lying on some sheets 
in the living room with a gunshot wound in her left eye. 
Appellant said he had been in the shower, heard a gunshot, and 
came out to find his wife lying on the floor. 
On June 16, 1987, appellant was charged with second degree 
murder. After a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, the 
information was dismissed for lack of probable cause to bind 
defendant over for trial. A year later, on July 5, 1988, the 
information was refiled. A second Dreliminarv hearina was held 
before the same magistrate. On October 24, 1988, the magistrate 
found that refiling was appropriate based on new or previously 
unavailable evidence. The magistrate determined that the new 
evidence, along with the evidence presented at the former 
hearing, gave rise to probable cause to bind appellant over to 
stand trial. 
Appellant moved the district court to quash the bindover 
order. The State moved to strike appellant's motion to quash. 
The district court granted the State's motion on the ground that 
it lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing. Appellant petitioned the 
Utah Supreme Court for permission to appeal from the district 
court's interlocutory order, and the court denied permission. 
The district court then accepted the information, and appellant 
was tried and convicted of criminal homicide, murder in the 
second degree. He appealed the conviction to the Utah Supreme 
Court, which, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1991), 
transferred the appeal to this court. 
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the district court 
had jurisdiction to review the bindover order; (2) whether the 
district court correctly accepted the information for purposes of 
proceeding to trial; and (3) whether the court properly concluded 
that the trial testimony of expert witnesses from the State 
Medical Examiner's Office did not violate Rules 403, 404 or 702 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF BINDOVER 
The first issue is whether the district court had 
jurisdiction to review the bindover order. State v. Humphrey. 
176 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 1991) is dispositive of this issue. 
The Humphrey court held that "the district court has the inherent 
authority and the obligation to determine whether its original 
jurisdiction has been properly invoked." Jd. at 9. In other 
words, "it is always proper for a trial court, as a threshold 
jurisdictional matter, to consider whether it has jurisdiction 
over a criminal defendant." Id. at 10. Further, Rule 12(b)(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure "explicitly gives 
district courts authority to review *defects in the indictment or 
information./M Id. at 9. 
Applying Humphrey, we hold that the district court erred in 
its initial refusal to review the bindover order. However, this 
error was harmless. Humphrey suggests that a challenge to a 
bindover order is mooted once a defendant has been convicted 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at n.6. The Utah Supreme Court 
held: "We believe this right [to a review of bindover orders] 
likewise would not be satisfied if the defendant first had to 
endure trial in the district court, because any challenges to the 
bindover order would be mooted by the trial verdict." Id. 
This holding is supported by case law from the United States 
Supreme Court and from this state establishing that an error at 
the preliminary stage is cured if the defendant is later 
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Mechanik. 
475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S. Ct. 938, 942 (1986) (presence of two 
witnesses in grand jury room, although illegal, is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt in light of subsequent conviction); 
Holt v. United States. 218 U.S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 4 (1910) 
(conviction upheld where errors such as hearsay and incompetent 
evidence occurred at indictment stage); see also State v. 
Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) (the fact defendant was 
convicted cured any defect in temporary period of possibly 
wrongful detention) (citing Gerstein v. Puah, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 
95 S. Ct. 854, 866 (1975)). 
Therefore, the question as to whether the information should 
have been quashed by the district court is moot because any 
defect was cured by defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
We now consider issues pertaining to the trial itself. 
Appellant argues that the testimony of Dr. Todd Grey, the medical 
examiner, and that of Brent Marchant of the State Medical 
Examiner's Office, to the effect that the nature of the victim's 
wounds was more consistent with homicide than with suicide, 
violated Rules 403, 404 and 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Because no contemporaneous objections to this testimony were 
made, appellant has waived his right to raise the matter on 
appeal, State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989), unless the testimony 
is plain error, id.; State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341-42 (Utah 
App. 1990), or unless there are unusual circumstances. See State 
v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991). 
Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides 
M[n]othing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court." The Utah Supreme Court established 
a two-part test to determine plain error. First, the error must 
be "plain." That is, "it should have been obvious to a trial 
court that it was committing error." Eldredqe, 773 P.2d at 35. 
Second, the error must affect the substantial rights of the 
accused. That is, the error must be harmful. Id. The policy 
behind the plain error test is to allow the court to reach 
justice in a given case. Id. at 35 n.8; Braun, 787 P.2d at 1342. 
See Utah R. Evid. 102. 
The transcript reveals that Dr. Grey did not give 
psychological profile testimony, condemned in State v. Rimmasch, 
775 P.2d 388, 400-03 (Utah 1989), nor did he vouch for the 
truthfulness of a witness's testimony based on anecdotal 
"statistical" evidence, condemned in State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 
498, 501 (Utah 1986) and also in State v. Iorq. 801 P.2d 938, 941 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Instead, Dr. Grey addressed the issue of whether the victim 
died via suicide or homicide by examining the physical evidence 
of the victim's body and by demonstrating the hypothesis of 
suicide using a live model whose arm length was identical to that 
of the victim. He had the model hold the gun in various 
positions to see whether it was possible for Mrs. Quas to shoot 
herself with the muzzle sixteen to eighteen inches away from the 
entry wound and with the gun oriented so that the bullet path 
would correspond to that of the victim. He had the model hold 
the gun with either hand, with both hands, and in a position so 
she could fire using her thumb. He also had the model hold the 
gun in these various positions with her arms extended as far as 
possible. He testified that the gun could be held in the right 
hand at fourteen or fifteen inches away, in the left hand at 
fourteen inches away, or in both hands at twelve and a half or 
thirteen inches away. He concluded that, while it may have been 
technically possible for Mrs. Quas to shoot herself, 
it's a very cumbersome and in my experience 
completely atypical way for somebody to 
commit suicide. When people shoot 
themselves, they usually put the gun where 
they want the bullet to go and pull the 
trigger. I've never seen a clearly proven 
suicide where the person has held the gun as 
far as away from their body as they possibly 
can before shooting. 
Here, the gist of the testimony goes to the fact that, if 
the victim had committed suicide, she chose a physically awkward 
and hence unlikely method to carry out the deed. 
Both Rammel and Iorg condemn the use of evidence "concerning 
matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis such as witness 
veracity," because such evidence leads to undue prejudice. Iorq. 
801 P.2d at 941-42. However, Rammel and Iorq do not apply in 
this case. First, Dr. Grey's testimony was not offered as 
statistical evidence that Mrs. Quas did not commit suicide. 
Rather, the testimony was offered to prove that, while it was 
technically possible to achieve suicide given the circumstances, 
it would have been "cumbersome" and "atypical." Second, Dr. Grey 
was not vouching for another witness's veracity, nor was he 
giving statistical probabilities for another's veracity. Third, 
even if the remark were prejudicial, it was not sufficiently 
obvious to invoke the plain error exception, especially in light 
of the corroborating evidence offered by this and other 
witnesses.1 
Brent Marchant, an investigator with the State Medical 
Examiner's Office, did not opine as to whether the death was a 
homicide or suicide. Neither did he testify as to the profile of 
a hypothetical suicide victim. He testified that Mrs. Quas's 
wound was unusual because, from his ten years# experience 
investigating many of the one hundred and fifty gunshot suicides 
that occur in Utah each year, he had seen only one suicide 
gunshot wound inflicted in the eye. That wound was a direct 
contact wound, unlike that of the victim. Therefore, even if 
Marchant's statement were erroneously admitted, the error is not 
sufficiently obvious to invoke the plain error exception. 
As to the other issues appellant raises on appeal, we have 
reviewed them and find them to be without merit. See State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt mooted any 
defects in the bindover order. The experts' conclusion that the 
evidencesupported a homicide rather than a suicide did not 
consti*tfte plain errq,r. Wosptierefore affirm. 
t? // 
'"'; v-
Re^nal W. Garff, Judge /y 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Orme, Judge 
1. While the requirement of obviousness may be waived in cases 
of Ha high degree of harmfulness,11 we do not find such a degree 
of harmfulness in this case in light of the corroborating 
evidence. Eldredae. 773 P.2d at 35 n.8; Braun, 787 P.2d at 1342. 
Appendix 2 
Humphrey decision 
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ement, a court lacks jurisdiction to decide the 
motion because there was no existing case in w h ^ 
to intervene. Jennings, 816 F.2d at 1491 n%4 
However, some courts, in considering the issue
 0f 
timeliness of a motion to intervene, have held th^t 
parties who have knowledge of contemplated inter. 
vention cannot cut off a right of intervention by
 a 
settlement. See Annotation, Time Within WM 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
Right to Intervene May Be Exercised, 37 A.L.R.^j 
1306, §18[b], at 1362 (1954). 
2. Utah Code Ann. §63-46(b)-9(2) states in full: 
The presiding officer shall grant a peti-
tion for intervention if he determines 
that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may 
be substantially affected by the formal 
adjudicative proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice and the 
orderly and prompt conduct of the 
adjudicative proceedings will not be 
materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention. 
Utah Administrative Rule 86M-5A(J), prom^j. 
gated by the Commission, also provides for intery. 
ention. Rule 861-1-5A(I) provides, with respect iQ 
motions for consolidation, and by referen^ 
motions for intervention, that the "presiding 
officer" has "wide discretion" in granting or denying 
motions. 
3. The Tax Commission expresses the concern that }t 
will have to give all governmental agencies that havc 
some legal interest in a given proceeding prior noti^ 
of their statutory right to intervene. We fail to s^ 
any reason why such a notice would have to t^ 
given. 
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DURHAM, Justice: 
Petitioners Vaughn I aughn Humphrey, Harry 
Jamar Gordan, and Bruce Mathews are cri-
minal defendants in unrelated felony cases 
pending in the district courts of this state. A 
circuit court judge acting as a magistrate 
bound each defendant over for trial in district 
court. Each defendant then moved the district 
court to quash the bindover order. In each 
case, the district court denied the motion, 
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to quash 
bindover orders. Each defendant filed an int-
erlocutory appeal with the Utah Court of 
Appeals. That court affirmed the district court 
rulings. State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (consolidating Hump-
hrey's and Gordan's appeals); State v. 
Mathews, No. 890666-CA (Utah Ct. App. 
June 21, 1990). All three cases, now consoli-
dated, are before us on a writ of certiorari. 
We reverse. 
The issue before us is whether, in light of 
recent statutory and constitutional changes 
associated with the creation of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, the district courts no longer have 
jurisdiction to quash bindover orders. This is 
solely a question of law, which we review 
under a correctness standard. We thus give no 
deference to the decisions below. See City of 
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 
(Utah), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990). 
Prior to 1986, the jurisdictional provision 
governing district courts gave them "appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and trib-
unals, and a supervisory control of the same." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4 (Supp. 1985). A 
1986 amendment eliminated this appellate 
jurisdiction. Judicial Article Implementation 
Act, ch. 47, §50, 1986 Utah Laws 136-37.1 
In each of the cases consolidated here, the 
trial court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdi-
ction to quash a bindover order was premised 
on this statutory change and a determination 
that quashal was an appellate function. The 
court of appeals similarly concluded that an 
attack on a bindover order /falls squarely 
within the classic definition of an appeal." 
Humphrey, 794 P.2d at 498. Before this court, 
the State urges the same conclusion, arguing 
that "what [defendants] sought was review on 
the record from the circuit court of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence presented to that 
court.... This type of on-the-record review 
of the sufficiency of the evidence ... can be 
nothing other than appellate review." 
This characterization of motions to quash 
bindover orders is twice flawed. First, it mis-
nding that there is probable cause to believe 
ie defendant has committed the crime 
larged in the information. See Utah R. Crim. 
. 7(8)(b). By the bindover order, the magis-
ate requires the defendant "to answer [the 
formation] in the district court/ Id. The 
formation is then transferred to the district 
>urt, permitting that court to take original 
risdiction of the matter.2 At that point, the 
strict court has the inherent authority and 
e obligation to determine whether its original 
risdiction has been properly invoked. In 
)ing so, the district court need show no 
ference to the magistrate's legal conclusion, 
tplicit in the bindover order, that the matter 
ay proceed to trial in district court, but may 
nduct its own review of the order. 
Our rules of criminal procedure help clarify 
e authority of district courts to control their 
iginal jurisdiction. Rule 25(a) permits the 
urt to dismiss an information "[i]n its disc-
tion, for substantial cause and in furtherance 
justice/ Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a). Rule 
(b) provides, "Any defense [or] objection ... 
lich is capable of determination without the 
al of the general issue may be raised prior to 
al." Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b). This authority 
review pretrial defects must be interpreted 
encompass review of the procedure by 
tich the matter came before the district 
art. Furthermore, rule 12(b)(1) explicitly 
res district courts authority to review 
efects in the indictment or information/ 
ah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1). When prosecution 
:urs by information rather than by indict-
nt, a preliminary hearing and bindover 
ier are integral parts of the prosecution; 
:hout the bindover, an information would 
t be before the district court. From the 
trict court's perspective, therefore, a defect 
the bindover order may be treated as a 
feet in the information.3 
Jurisdiction over a motion to quash a bin-
der order thus fits squarely within Utah 
le of Criminal Procedure 12 and follows 
ically from rule 25.4 The motion focuses a 
trict court's attention on the propriety of 
exercise of original jurisdiction, requiring a 
ermination of whether it can proceed with 
case. Although the examination of preli-
lary proceedings may involve a "review on 
record" of the magistrate's order, consi-
ation of a motion to quash a bindover 
ler does not constitute "appellate review" in 
formal sense. The conclusion that the 
lion is equivalent to an appeal is erroneous.5 
rhe second flaw in the State's characterize 
m of defendants' motions lies in its claim 
t defendants sought "review on the record 
m the circuit court." This mischaracteriza-
1 results in the erroneous conclusion, 
ued by the State and adopted by the court 
bindover order is through an interlocutory 
appeal to the court of appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) and (e). 
These statutes do not permit direct interlocu-
tory appeal of magistrates' bindover orders. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) gives the court of 
appeals jurisdiction over "appeals from the 
circuit courts," and section 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
gives it jurisdiction over "interlocutory appeals 
from any court of record in criminal cases." 
In the instant cases, however, the records were 
not created in a circuit court or any other 
court of record; rather, they were created 
before a magistrate, as provided by Utah Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 7(7). Although the 
magistrate in each case also happened to be a 
circuit court judge (as is true in most cases), 
our statutory provisions make an unmistakable 
distinction between the functions and powers 
of a judicial officer acting as magistrate and 
one acting as judge of a court. By definition, 
"'[magistrate' means a justice of the 
Supreme Court, a judge of the district courts, 
a judge of the juvenile courts, a judge of the 
circuit courts, a judge of the justice courts, or 
a judge of any court created by law." Utah 
Code Ann. §77-1-3 (Supp. 1990). These 
individuals, "when sitting as magistrates hav[e] 
the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law 
upon magistrates and not those that pertain to 
their respective judicial offices." Van Dam v. 
Morris, 571 P..2d 1325, 1327 (Utah 1977); cf. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-7-16 (powers of 
judges contradistinguished from powers of 
their courts). Magistrates are not "circuit 
courts."6 Furthermore, because the statutory 
definition of magistrate includes judges of 
courts not of record, as defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §78-1-2, the respective functions of 
courts of record and magistrates are not coe-
xtensive. 
Instead, a magistrate's statutory role is to 
assist courts of record in various preliminary 
matters in felony cases and to be more exten-
sively involved with misdemeanor cases.7'A 
magistrate's contribution to a felony procee-
ding is entirely nonadjudicative: "A prelimi-
nary hearing is not a trial, and a magistrate ... 
does not sit as a judge of a court and exercises 
none of the powers of a judge ...." Morris, 
571 P.2d at 1327. The fact that a magistrate's 
dismissal of a charge does not preclude subs-
equent prosecution of the same offense, see 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(8)(c), substantiates the 
determination that magistrates do not adjud-
icate.8 We thus conclude, contrary to the court 
of appeals' decision below, see 794 P.2d at 
500, that a judicial officer functioning as a 
magistrate is not functioning as a circuit court 
or other court of record. Because magistrates 
are not courts of record when they conduct 
preliminary hearings and issue bindover 
to conclude that magistrates are not courts,
 a 
conclusion we reached fifteen years ago in Afor. 
ris, we are aware that other case law a^j 
some provisions of our rules of criminal pro-
cedure and our statutes are inconsistent with 
this holding. In State v. Schreuder, 712 P . j j 
264, 270 (Utah 1985), we held that a bindover 
order entered by a district court judge c o u ^ 
be challenged by interlocutory appeal to this 
court.10 Dicta in Schreuder suggested th^t 
interlocutory appeal also was possible "fro^ 
bindover orders entered in any court." 7 ^ 
P.2d at 270. Our choice of this language w ^ 
probably the result of a common but techi^. 
cally incorrect practice of referring to magi$_ 
trates as courts. This imprecision in Schreud^r 
was immaterial, however, because at the tii^e 
the appellate jurisdiction of this court was not 
specifically limited to review of courts of 
record (and the Utah Court of Appeals djj 
not yet exist). See Utah Code Ann. §78-^_ 
2 (1977). We must be more careful today, n o ^ 
that, the more precise jurisdictional statutes of 
both this court and the court of appeals have 
limited jurisdiction over interlocutory criminal 
orders to review of "appeals from any court of 
record." Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(3)(h) 
78-2a-3(2)(e)(1991). 
# To the extent that language in the .Uta^ 
Rules, of Criminal Procedure also implies th^t 
some functions of magistrates continue to b e 
reviewable on interlocutory appeal, the rul^s 
will need revision to conform with the actu^j 
status of magistrates and the recent statutory 
modifications in jurisdiction. Legislative rev|. 
sions may also be in order to ensure that a\\ 
Statutory provisions recognize the distinction 
between the functions of .magistrates ang 
courts. 
Magistrates .are - not courts or tribunal^ 
They exercise magisterial, not adjudicatory, 
functions. Review of their orders cannot pro' 
perly.be subjected to appellate review und^r 
our statutory scheme. More importantly, it } s 
always proper for a trial court, as a threshold 
jurisdictional matter, to consider whether }t 
has jurisdiction over a criminal defendant. W e 
therefore reverse and remand these cases tc} 
the district .courts for consideration of thi 
merits o f the motions to quash. 
Reversed and remanded. 
WE CONCUR:. 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate* Chief Justice 
U Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman* Justice 
grantecj 
but thL 
l . J A subsequent amendment once again 
district courts-some appellate jurisdiction, u i ims 
added jurisdiction is limited to review of informaj 
agency adjudicative proceedings. District courts stilj 
i _ ^ »«, i w n » i M C r t r < i 
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this could not occur until after the magistrate's 
preliminary hearing and bindover. See Utah Code 
Ann. §77-17-1 (1978); see also State v. Freeman, 
71 P.2d 196, 199 (Utah 1937) (holding that inform^ 
ation can be filed properly in district court "only 
after the accused has been duly bound over and held 
to answer in the district court by a magistrate"). 
Although under the current statutory scheme a 
felony information (rather than a complaint) is first 
filed before a magistrate, see Utah R. Crim. P. 5(a) 
& 7(2), it is still true that the district court does not 
acquire jurisdiction until after a bindover order 
issues and the information and all other records are 
transferred to the district court. See Utah R. Crim. 
P. 10(a) (arraignment to occur only when all records 
are*received by district court after bindover); cf. 
Utah Const, art. I, §13 (permitting offenses to be 
"prosecuted by information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination 
be waived"). 
3. Indeed, as petitioners suggest, there may be no 
meaningful difference between quashal of a bind-
over order and dismissal of an information. Histo-
rically, an information could not be filed until after 
a preliminary hearing and bindover order, see supra 
note 2, and thus defects in the hearing or order 
would infect the information. We do not decide 
whether, under our current statutory scheme, there 
is a difference between guashal of a bindover order 
and dismissal of an information. We conclude only 
that the district court's authority to review defective 
informations includes the authority to review.defe-
ctive bindover orders. 
4. As petitioners point out, this reading of rules 12 
and 25 is also consistent with rule 10(c). That rule, 
however^ is not directly at issue in these cases 
because these cases do not involve guilty pleas. 
5. The court of appeals cited State v. Schreuder, 712 
P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that 
attacks on bindover orders constitute appeals. Hum-
phrey, 794 P.2d at 498. Schreuder is inappo-
site. It presented an equal protection claim at a time 
(before the recent jurisdictional modifications that 
gave rise to the cases before us today) when district 
courts routinely reviewed bindover orders of circuit 
court judges. Atypically, in Schreuder the defen-
dant's preliminary hearing had been conducted by a 
district court judge. The defendant therefore made 
an equal protection argument that he did not have 
the opportunity, available to defendants bound over 
by circuit court judges, for 'superior court" review. 
We
 f held that in this circumstance the defendant 
could seek superior court review of his preliminary 
hearing through interlocutory appfeal to this court. 
712 P.2d at 270. But the availability of interlocutory 
appeal is irrelevant t6 whether *ar trial -court also has 
the" authority to satisfy itself that* a defendant, is 
properly before it. Schreuder is further inapposite 
because we conclude below.that under our.current 
statutory scheme, interlocutory review of a jnagist-
rate's bindover order is no longer ^ available, 
6. We note that if the orders of magistrates w r^e in 
fact'orders of a circuit court, the Utah State Cons-
titution would provide an appeaf ks of right from 
these orders. Utah Const.'ah.'I, §12, art. VIII, 
§5. Interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals 
would not satisfy this requirement. We believe this 
right likewise would not be'satisfied if the defendant 
this constitutional problem. 
7. Currently, the powers and duties of magistrates 
are scattered through various provisions of titles 77 
and 78 of the Utah Code and through the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, especially rule 7. The 
partial codification of the authority of magistrates 
in new section 78-7-17.5 of the Utah Code, eff-
ective January 1, 1992, further reinforces our con-
clusion that magistrates do not exercise adjudicatory 
authority. 
I. We also note that magistrates routinely issue 
search warrants to assist in the administration of 
ustice and district courts routinely review those 
variants without functioning as appellate courts. In 
ts brief, the State argues that this review is not the 
ame as reviewing bindover orders, because "[a] 
listrict court reviews the sufficiency of the search 
warrant only to determine whether evidence will be 
idmissible in the trial pending in that court. It does 
tot issue an order overturning the order of another 
ourt ...." But a district court's review of the suff-
aency of the preliminary hearing and bindover 
•rder similarly serves only to determine whether the 
lformation will be accepted in that court for the 
urposes of proceeding to trial. When quashal is 
ppropriate, the district court does not overturn the 
rder of another court; it vacates the order of the 
lagistrate. 
Of course, once a district court has refused to 
uash a bindover order, the district court's ruling 
>uld then become the subject of an interlocutory 
>peal. 
I. See supra n.5. 
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
We granted certiorari to review a memora-
ndum decision of the court of appeals which 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff 
Percy Mounteer's complaint against defendant 
Utah Power & Light Company (UP&L). 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 773 
P.2d 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The dismissal 
was for plaintiffs failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
Plaintiff was employed by UP&L in its 
mining activities in Emery County. In Dece-
mber 1984, a fire at the Wilberg Mine caused 
the death of twenty-one miners. Plaintiff was 
on duty when the fire broke out, and as a 
result of his involvement in endeavoring to 
control the fire, he developed symptoms of 
post-traumatic stress syndrome. However, he 
continued in his employment. Some time later, 
Niki Larsen, an in-house security guard 
employed by UP&L, was assigned to investi-
gate plaintiff for suspected drug use. During 
an interview of plaintiff at his work, she all-
egedly called the mine superintendent over a 
loudspeaker and accused plaintiff of being on 
drugs. Other employees heard the accusations. 
Plaintiff asserts that this accusation aggrav-
ated his post-traumatic stress syndrome, 
requiring him to be treated at a psychiatric 
hospital and rendering him permanently disa-
bled from employment. 
Plaintiff brought this action for slander, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
UP&L moved to dismiss the complaint purs-
uant to rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proc-
edure, for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted. The motion was prem-
ised on our decision in Bryan v. Utah Intern-
ational, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975), which held 
that an employee acting in the course and 
scope of his or her employment who intenti-
onally injures a co-worker is not protected 
by the exclusivity provision of our Workers* 
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
60. However, the employer is liable only to the 
extent of workers' compensation benefits 
unless the employer directed or intended the 
injurious act. In the instant action, the trial 
court granted the motion to dismiss after 
reviewing the complaint and finding that pla-
intiff had failed to allege facts supporting an 
inference that UP&L had intended or directed 
Larsen's injurious act. The court of appeals 
agreed that Bryan was controlling and affi-
rmed the dismissal. 
Plaintiff first contends that the court of 
appeals erred in holding that his claim for 
slander against UP&L was barred by Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-60, which provides: 
